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The field of high-energy physics (HEP), along with many scientific disciplines, is currently expe-
riencing a dramatic influx of new methodologies powered by modern machine learning techniques.
Over the last few years, a growing body of HEP literature has focused on identifying promising
applications of deep learning in particular, and more recently these techniques are starting to be
realized in an increasing number of experimental measurements. The overall conclusion from this
impressive and extensive set of studies is that rarer and more complex physics signatures can be
identified with the new set of powerful tools from deep learning. However, there is an unstudied
systematic risk associated with combining the traditional HEP workflow and deep learning with
high-dimensional data. In particular, calibrating and validating the response of deep neural net-
works is in general not experimentally feasible, and therefore current methods may be biased in
ways that are not covered by current uncertainty estimates. By borrowing ideas from AI safety, we
illustrate these potential issues and propose a method to bound the size of unaccounted for uncer-
tainty. In addition to providing a pragmatic diagnostic, this work will hopefully begin a dialogue
within the community about the robust application of deep learning to experimental analyses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Experiments in collider-based high-energy physics
(HEP) rely critically on detailed simulations which model
length scales from sub-nuclear reactions all the way to
macroscopic detector-length scales in order to connect
fundamental theories to experimentally-observable quan-
tities. Typical experiments, such as measurements of
physical constants or searches for new particle species,
are designed using blinded methodology, and depend on
these calibrated simulations to predict the relative rates
of background and signal events. These predictions are
in turn used to define the statistical significance and/or
confidence intervals of the results observed after unblind-
ing. While the simulations involved in this process are
highly sophisticated, they are only an approximation to
reality and therefore systematic mismodeling must be ac-
counted for by calibrating to data, when possible, and by
assessing systematic uncertainties.
Traditionally, partitions of the data known as signal
and control regions are defined by applying selective cri-
teria on physical observables, in order to isolate regions
of the data that are expected to be sensitive to the phe-
nomena of interest from well-understood phenomena. It
is then possible to validate and/or calibrate the simu-
lated background predictions against data observed in
the signal-free region without biasing the blinded analy-
sis. However, it is often the case that several different ob-
servables, perhaps following some complicated relation-
ship, are useful for defining such regions of the data. A
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typical application of machine learning in HEP is to auto-
mate the construction of signal and control regions by re-
formulating the task as an optimization problem; for ex-
ample, a binary classifier may be trained on simulations
to label observed events as signal-like or background-like.
While this has been done for years using “shallow” classi-
fiers such as Boosted Decision Trees, the success of these
methods have generally depended strongly on the choice
of features input to the classifier, incurring a significant
amount of effort towards “feature engineering” to iden-
tify useful high-level observables.
With the more recent introduction of deep learn-
ing methods, it has become possible to construct in-
creasingly elaborate classification models using higher-
dimensionality input features. Perhaps surprisingly,
it has been shown1 that when provided with high-
dimensional low-level (HDLL) features (i.e. observ-
ables that are minimally processed using physical intu-
ition), deep neural networks are able to automatically
learn to exceed the performance of networks trained on
physically-motivated high-level features.
Increasingly, experimentalists at the Large Hadron
Collider (LHC) and elsewhere are taking this message
seriously. While the first analysis-level deep learning re-
sults from the LHC are only starting to become public
(see e.g. [8–10]), analysis-non-specific deep learning mod-
els have been used for a few years, notably with early suc-
cessful applications in flavor tagging [11, 12]. In addition,
there is a plethora of experimental and phenomenological
1 There are now too many examples to cite them all here. Ref-
erences [1–3] are recent reviews of deep learning in HEP and
References [4–7] were the earliest applications of deep learning
to collider-based HEP classification problems.
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2studies for additional methods which will likely be real-
ized as part of physics analyses in the near future. This
includes proposals to use the lowest-level inputs available
from the detector, reaching input feature dimensionalities
of O(105) [13, 14] and beyond.
A potential problem with this approach arises when
combining deep learning on HDLL features with the
conventional simulation-based analysis paradigm. In
the traditional approach, uncertainties on the extrapo-
lation between the control region and the signal region
rely on simulation variations that can be validated on
a small number of one-dimensional physically-motivated
features. Correlated uncertainties covering the full HDLL
feature space are often not known or experimentally in-
feasible [15]. Moreover, low-dimensional validation may
be insufficient: recent developments in the area of Ar-
tificial Intelligence (AI) safety have demonstrated that
when neural networks operate on high-dimensional input
spaces, classification performance of neural networks can
be arbitrarily degraded by applying subtle variations to
the input features [16, 17].
To illustrate this challenge, we implement an adver-
sarial attack that demonstrates small perturbations in
detector-level measurements can have drastic effects on
the performance of a neural network trained to identify
signal-like events. This adversarial procedure can be con-
ceptualized as a sort of demon [18] which intercedes be-
tween a physical process and the observation of that pro-
cess, in such a way as to maximally confound a neural
network while remaining minimally noticeable by current
experimental standards. While certainly no such demon
exists, we propose a procedure based on this concept as
a diagnostic tool to evaluate the worst-case sensitivity of
a deep network-based anaysis to uncertainty from mis-
modeling high-dimensional correlations. This bound may
then be used either to demonstrate that a given network
architecture is manifestly robust against a certain class
of systematic uncertainties, or as a guiding metric to aid
in the future development of more robust networks.
II. BENCHMARK PROBLEM
As one of the first examples from HEP in which both
feature engineering and deep learning have demonstrated
promising advantages, jet classification [1] is a natural
testing ground for this study. Jets are collimated sprays
of particles resulting from high energy quark and gluon
fragmentation, which are clustered [19] into groups that
approximate physical states in the original hard scatter-
ing process. A typical problem is to identify whether a
jet originated from a quark/gluon state, or by the decay
of some intermediate massive particle. In particular, we
simulate two pp scattering processes: a background con-
sisting of dijets, and a signal comprised of Z-bosons pro-
duced in association with an energetic photon, in which
the Lorentz-boosted Z particle subsequently decays to a
pair of quarks.
All samples are simulated at parton-level using Mad-
graph5 [20], with fragmentation by Pythia 8 [21, 22], and
an ATLAS-like detector simulation by Delphes 3.4.1 [23].
Activated regions of the simulated calorimeter detector
(‘towers’) are clustered using the anti-kt algorithm with
radius parameter R = 1 [19], and only the highest2-
pT jet of each event is considered for the classification
task. Furthermore, selected events must contain a jet
with pT > 300 GeV and mass m > 50 GeV/c
2. This
jet must also be comprised of at least three constituent
towers.
After clustering, a jet Ji is represented as a trun-
cated list3 of Ni ≤ 64 constituent 4-momenta: Ji =
{(pkT, ηk, φk) : k = 1, ..., Ni}. The resulting dimensional-
ity of observable features for learning is thus about 200.
The pT of each constituent is expressed in units of TeV,
resulting in a maximum value that is of order unity, suit-
able for input to neural networks. Jets are then input to
two different network architectures which are trained to
discriminate signal jets from background jets.
The first architecture, referred to as the High-level
(HL) model, has a first layer with no learnable parame-
ters which computes four jet-level observables from the
input constituents: pT, η, invariant mass, and D
(β=2)
2 .
The first three features simply represent the 4-vector as-
sociated with the entire jet; the quantity D2 [24] is the-
oretically motivated from the strong force and designed
to identify jets with radiation patterns consistent with
two sub-jet axes, characteristic of Lorentz boosted boson
decays. The remainder of the network is comprised of 3
fully-connected layers, each with 384 units and ReLU ac-
tivation, followed by a single output neuron with sigmoid
activation.
The second architecture, referred to as the Low-level
(LL) model, is a Particle Flow Network [25], also with
a special non-parameteric first layer. This layer shifts
the (η, φ) values of constituents such that the jet axis
is centered at zero. This common preprocessing step is
done within the network so that adversarial attacks are
unable to alter the jet origin. The benchmark LL model
has three layers in the Φ subnetwork with 256, 256, 64
units and threelayers in the F subnetwork, each with
256 units. Both subnetworks use ReLU activations on
all layers. The final layer is again a single neuron with
sigmoid activation. We note that similar results were
obtained using a simple fully-connected network. How-
ever, the PFN architecture is invariant with respect to
permutations of the input constituents, which simplifies
the interpretation as reordering caused by the adversary
2 Using collider coordinates, pT is the particle momentum trans-
verse to the collision axis, φ is the azimuthal angle and the
pseudo-rapidity η is − ln(tan(θ/2)), where θ is the polar angle.
3 The architecture described below can accommodate a variable
number of inputs. However, the adversarial setup is currently
configured to output a fixed size perturbation. The loss in per-
formance when using more than 64 constituents was negligible.
3has no impact on the result. We suspect that any other
similarly performing LL network (see e.g. Ref. [26]) will
have a similar susceptibility as the PFN.
Both networks are implemented using Keras [27] and
Tensorflow [28], and are trained using the Adam [29] op-
timizer. The loss function is the binary cross-entropy to
classify signal and background events. After tuning the
architectures via hyperparameter scans, we found the LL
network (AUC=0.88) was able to significantly outper-
form the HL network (AUC=0.79), as is often the case.
III. METHODS
To demonstrate the potential sensitivity of HDLL net-
works to subtle mismodeling of their input features, we
subject each of our benchmark networks to an adversar-
ial attack. An adversarial attack exploits the gradient of
the (fixed) target network with respect to its inputs, in
order to shift those inputs to solicit the desired response
from the classifier.
Note that in order to realize the specific mismodeling
necessary to foil a particular classifier, the parameters
of the target network must be known; hence the “de-
mon” posited in Sec. I. Nonetheless, as this attack yields
a mathematically optimal perturbation to a given input
for a given network, it can be viewed as a worst-case sce-
nario. Therefore, if a specific network is shown to be ro-
bust against the attack, it is also reasonable to conclude
that the effects of any intractable systematic mismod-
elings present in physics simulations are safe to ignore.
Conversely, if a network is shown to be sensitive to such
attacks, the adversarially-induced systematic shift can be
viewed only as a (potentially weak) upper bound for more
realistic systematic effects. In this case, a poor upper
bound may indicate more careful scrutiny of a network’s
systematic exposure is warranted. The bound may also
be used as a guiding metric in the development of more
robust models, as discussed in Sec. V.
In this work we implement two different forms of ad-
versarial attack. The first is based on the fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) proposed in Ref. [17], which com-
putes a bounded perturbation for a given input. The
second is a broader attack utilizing an adversarial neu-
ral network which learns to construct malicious jets for
arbitrary inputs. The former method is the most literal
realization of our “demon”, as each jet is individually
modified to optimally confound the network. The lat-
ter demonstrates that there exists a universal mapping
between one dataset (e.g. simulation) and another (e.g.
experimental data) which systematically affects network
performance. Therefore the adversary can be thought of
as transfer function representing a measurement effect or
theoretical mismodeling.
In both cases, our demon is tasked with transforming
signal jets to induce a background-like response from the
benchmark classifier. In such a scenario, an experimen-
tal analysis optimized using the simulated signal model
would be very likely to reject true signal events as back-
ground. This in turn could lead to overconfidently ex-
cluding a theoretical hypothesis, or even missing a dis-
covery of new physics altogether.
A. Fast Gradient Sign Method
The FGSM method works by taking an individual jet
Ji and regressing the loss function to compute a bounded
perturbation δJi, such that network’s response to the
input Ji + δJi tends towards some desired value. Specif-
ically, the perturbation is given by:
δJi = sign [∇JLXE (f(J), ybg)]|J=Ji , (1)
where f is the target classifier network, LXE is the bi-
nary crossentropy loss function, and ybg is the label corre-
sponding to background events. The size of the gradient
is scaled to a free parameter , as described below. This
ensures that the perturbation of each input observable
is bounded while moving approximately in the direction
normal to the decision boundary.
In our example, this gradient, like the input, is a 64×3
tensor, where the quantities on the second axis repre-
sent pT, η, and φ. We want to ensure that the pertur-
bation is small relative to experimental resolution, yet
these observables have rather different scales associated
to them. To accommodate this, and ensure a physi-
cally relevant perturbation, the perturbation is given by
Ji 7→ Ji(1 + pTδJi) + ΩδJi, where pT = (, 0, 0) and
Ω = (0, , ). In principle, these  do not need to be the
same, but are chosen here to all be  = 0.001. All mul-
tiplications in Eq. 1 follow tensorflow broadcast seman-
tics [28]. This procedure is iteratively applied 10 times
so the scale of the perturbations are bounded by 0.01.
B. Adversarial Network Method
In this approach, given a target classifier f , we train
a second neural network g. The goal is to learn a map
g(J) 7→ J ′, for an arbitrary signal or background jet J
such that the classifier network f will perceive J ′ as back-
ground. Because various observables O can be validated
against data for backgrounds, it is important that the
distribution before Pr(O(J)|J ∈ bg) match the distribu-
tion Pr(O(g(J))|J ∈ bg) after perturbation. For practi-
cal reasons, we enforce this by preventing the adversary
from making large changes to these observables on a jet-
by-jet basis for background events.
To further simplify training, we also bound the degree
to which g can modify constituents, and prevent it from
creating new constituents within a jet. In particular, the
adversary is unable to induce collinear splittings or add
spurious soft radiation that physically-motivated observ-
ables are often designed to be robust against. Given these
constraints in the form of g, the attack presented here
4represents a worst-case scenario only for a specific class
of mismodeling. As it turns out, even this restricted form
of attack can have surprisingly large effects; we leave the
assessment of sensitivity to more general attack models
to future work.
The adversarial network is trained by minimizing sep-
arate loss functions for signal and background defined
by:
Lsig = log(1− f(g(J))), (2)
Lbg = λcls(f(J)− f(g(J)))2
+
∑
i
λ
(i)
obs(O(i)(J)−O(i)(g(J))2 . (3)
Lsig is the categorical crossentropy, which impels g to
modify signal jets so as to be labeled as background by f .
The first term of Lbg minimizes changes between the tar-
get network’s response to the jet before and after the ad-
versarial perturbation. The functions O(i)(J) : R3N → R
represent any features of interest to be preserved. The
tunable hyperparameters λcls, λ
(i)
obs ≥ 0 encode the ad-
versary’s preference to preserve the target network re-
sponse and observable features, respectively, for back-
ground events.
In our experiments, g is a fully-connected network with
4 hidden layers, each with 300 units and ReLU activation.
The penultimate layer has 64×3 units, with tanh activa-
tion. Analogously to the sign function in Eq. 1 and the
bounding parameters  in Sec. III A, the outputs of the fi-
nal layer are bounded by applying a tanh activation, and
the axes corresponding to pT, η, and φ are scaled by pa-
rameters ρpT , ρη, and ρφ, respectively. The output of this
layer represents a differential change in the input jet, δJ .
The final layer is essentially a residual skip-connection
layer computing J + δJ as described in Sec. III A.
A separate adversary is trained for each of the HL and
LL benchmark networks. In both cases, the bounding
magnitude of the constituent perturbations are fixed at
~ρ = 0.02, which is slightly larger than the scale of pertur-
bations for the FGSM. Two observable constraints are in-
cluded in Lbg: the jet mass and pT. The parameters λcls
and λobs are tuned by training until either convergence
or until certain validation criteria are violated. The val-
idation criteria are met when the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff
(KS) test statistic between perturbed and unperturbed
background distributions are below heuristically-defined
thresholds of 0.04 for jet mass and pT, and 0.02 for clas-
sifier response. In practice, these thresholds would be
set by the data statistics as well as the size of known
experimental uncertainties. A more realistic test in prac-
tice is to consider the χ2 agreement between validation
histograms evaluated in an unblinded control region, as
illustrated in Fig. 1 for the case of the LL network.
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FIG. 1: Illustration of typical validation procedure.
Pseudodata (black points) are sampled from the BG
distribution with the adversarial perturbation applied; solid
histograms show the unperturbed BG model. Top: The
unshaded control region in this case is defined where the
signal efficiency is expected to be less than 10%; the shaded
region would typically be blinded when designing an
experiment. The green vertical line indicates the expected
optimal signal region. Middle, Bottom: The jet pT and mass
distributions for events in the control region. Good
agreement is observed between the “observed” pseudodata
and the expected background model in the control region for
all three observables. The χ2/ndf values are 14.7/14,
25.0/40, and 37.8/40 repsectively.
IV. RESULTS
To quantify the effect of these adversarial attacks, we
consider a simplified example of a typical experimental
analysis in HEP. If S and B are the predicted number of
signal and background events, respectively, then in the
asymptotic limit (S +B  1, S  B [30]), the expected
statistical significance of an observation with respect to
the background-only hypothesis is S/
√
B, in units of
standard deviations. After considering only events that
pass a classifier threshold, the relative change in the sig-
nificance is S/
√
B , where S is the true positive rate
(signal efficiency) and B is the false positive rate (back-
ground efficiency). A classifier is only useful for improv-
ing the sensitivity of a search if this relative discovery
significance exceeds unity. The relative discovery signif-
5icance for both the LL and HL classifiers are shown in
Fig. 2. As expected given it’s AUC (Sec. II), the LL
classifier yields a more sensitive result than the HL clas-
sifier, with peak relative discovery significances of about
2.5 and 1.5, respectively. Figure 2 additionally shows
the relative discovery significance after the application of
the FGSM. This bounded perturbation is only applied to
signal events and designed to make them look more like
background events. Both the LL and HL relative dis-
covery significance are degraded by this perturbation by
about 30%. Additionally, the optimal classifier thresh-
old shifts for the HL case, so a threshold chosen based
on the nominal simulation would actually have a relative
discovery significance less than unity in the perturbed
simulation.
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FIG. 2: The relative discovery significance as a function of
the classifier threshold for HL observables and LL
observables before and after the FGSM perturbation. Also
shown is the effect induced by randomly perturbing
constituents with the same  values used for the FGSM.
The FGSM attack has bounded perturbations on the
jet constituent four-vectors, but is otherwise uncon-
strained. Figure 3 shows the modifications to various
signal observables as a result of the FGSM attack. Due
to the limited size of the perturbation, the qualitative
shapes of the signal pT, mass, and D
(β=2)
2 distributions
are the same and after the FGSM perturbation. Of these,
the mass distribution is most affected. The distributions
of the classifier outputs are shifted to the left, overlap-
ping more with the background distribution, hence the
degradation observed in Fig. 2.
While the FGSM perturbation is illustrative, it is too
synthetic because only the signal events are attacked and
there are no constraints on HL observables that can be
validated. The adversarial attack described in Sec. III B
avoids both of these issues, and the analog to Fig. 2 is pre-
sented in Fig. 4. For these discovery significance curves,
both the signal and background distributions are per-
turbed by the same network, representing a consistent
mismodeling between the jets expected by the simula-
tion model (pre-perturbation), and the jets actually ob-
served in our hypothetical scenario (post-perturbation).
The degradation in the relative discovery significance is
comparable to the FGSM for the fully trained LL net-
work, however, we were unable to train an adversary to
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FIG. 3: The classifier output and various observables before
and after the FGSM attack for signal and background. Only
1500 signal jets are used for the FGSM perturbation.
produce as large an effect on the HL network. This is to
be expected, as the HL network derives much of its clas-
sification power from the jet mass observable, which the
adversarial network is constrained to minimally change.
Fig. 4 also demonstrates the effect of the adversarial
attack on deliberately undertrained instances of the LL
network. We found that the classifier network’s train-
6ing is interruped early on, the susceptibility to the ad-
versarial attack is reduced, and tends to increase with
additional training. In particular, when the LL network
is trained only to the same level of performance as the
HL network, it is nearly impervious to the adversarial
attack. We hypothesize that the additional information
the LL network uses in order to outperform the HL net-
work is more sensitive to small-scale perturbations than
the theoretically-motivated HL observables. Although
this effect seems to have spurious counterexamples due
to random network initialization, the trend may suggest
that undertraining very sensitive HDLL networks could
be be a useful regularization technique to build in analy-
sis robustness, while still providing a performance boost
relative to HL architectures.
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FIG. 4: Effect of adversarial mismodeling on discovery
significance, for high-level and low-level feature networks.
The vertical gray line indicates the expected optimal
selection threshold, which differs by about 25% from the
“true” significance when taking the adversarial perturbation
into account. The HL network’s expected sensitivity differs
by about 15% from the true value. While the fully-trained
low-level network is expected to perform better than the
high-level network, it is also more strongly affected by an
adversarial attack. However, when the LL network is
deliberately undertrained, its susceptibility is reduced. Also
shown is the effect induced by randomly perturbing
constituents by a uniform distribution in the range [−ρ,+ρ].
Representative HL features and the classifier distribu-
tions for the adversarial attack are presented in Fig. 5.
Even though both signal and background jets are sub-
jected to the same adversary, the background distribu-
tions are nearly identical before and after the perturba-
tion. In contrast, the classifier response and mass dis-
tributions are noticeably distorted for the signal. This
allows the systematic mismodeling induced by the ad-
versary to go undetected in typical experimental condi-
tions, as shown in Fig. 1. The green line delineating
the signal region corresponds to the maximum discovery
significance expected based on the simulated signal and
background models. The shaded region, defined as the
region in which expected signal efficiency exceeds 10%,
is taken to be blinded during experimental design and
validation phase. ‘Observations’ are samples from the
perturbed simulation and the ‘Expected’ prediction is
the unperturbed simulation. The jet pT and mass dis-
tributions in the validation region agree well between the
Observed and Expected values to within statistical un-
certainty. Despite this apparent agreement, due to the
adversary’s effect on jets in the signal region, the dis-
covery sensitivity for a potential signal at the predicted
optimal working point is reduced by about 25% as shown
in Fig. 4.
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FIG. 5: Comparison of the effect the adversarial network
perturbations on the LL and HL classifier response, as well
as various jet observables.
7V. DISCUSSION
In the traditional HEP search paradigm, simulations
are used to extrapolate predictions from a control re-
gion to a signal region. Many sources of uncertainty
on this extrapolation are well-constrained from auxiliary
measurements on individual reconstructed objects, but
others are mostly unvalidated from data. For example,
the modeling of strong-force processes related to hadron
formation is a complex multiscale process for which it
is customary to compare two different models (such as
Pythia [21, 22] and Herwig [31, 32] or Sherpa [33, 34]).
These algorithms model the same physical processes in
different ways, with a mix of formal and phenomenologi-
cal insight, and the difference between models is treated
as a systematic uncertainty in statistical analyses. Given
the high dimensionality of collider events, it is unlikely
that a single nuisance parameter encoding the distance
between two arbitrary models represents a reasonable
prior to cover the distribution of all possible systematic
mismodelings.
The results of Sec. IV show that small perturbations
in the high-dimensional phase space of collider events
can significantly change the scientific conclusions from
a given dataset. If a complete uncertainty model in high-
dimensions ensured that such perturbations were unphys-
ical, then the adversarial results are irrelevant. However,
this is not the current situation described above. Fur-
thermore, networks trained on high-dimensional low-level
inputs can outperform networks trained on high-level fea-
tures precisely because they can take advantage of subtle
correlations distributed across multiple dimensions. The
modeling of such correlations are particularly difficult to
validate. Significant physics input is required to build a
full phase space uncertainty model.
As is characteristic of problems involving nonconvex
optimization, is difficult to show that a particular ad-
versarial attack is maximal. Therefore, the existence of
an attack with a particular impact only provides a lower
bound for the upper bound. Nonetheless, if a certain
network architecture is repeatedly shown to be partic-
uarly difficult to attack, it may lend credibility to the
currently-accepted treatment of simply ignoring certain
high-dimensional systematic uncertainties.
In any case, for now the method described here offers
the only rigorous means for quantifying how sensitive an
analysis procedure is to high-dimensional mismodeling.
A given analysis procedure, including the control/signal
region definition and any auxiliary features that will be
validated in data, can be attacked to quantify the impact
on the signal sensitivity. While general methods from AI
safety may also be useful for making classifiers robust
to attacks, Sec. IV demonstrated that networks based
on physically-motivated features can be less sensitive to
adversarial perturbations, if only because it is feasible
to ensure these observables are modeled reliably. How-
ever, it may be possible to design sensitive architectures
that are able to leverage low-level information while re-
maining robust against adversarial attacks, for example
by exploiting symmetries and other physically-motivated
constraints. Additionally, evidence suggests that pur-
posefully undertraining HDLL networks may serve to re-
duce systematic exposure while meeting the performance
of simpler HL network models.
Even though the adversarial methods presented in
Sec. IV were able to make targeted attacks knowing the
full form of the classifier, they are not the most gen-
eral attack possible. First of all, the perturbations were
not allowed to split particles into multiple particles nor
were they able to add new particles. The modeling of
such ‘soft’ and ‘collinear’ physics is particularly challeng-
ing and so such effects are an interesting class of per-
turbations for future studies. Second, the true values of
individual features or combinations of features are not
observable - only distribution-level statistics can be val-
idated. In this work, per-constituent perturbations were
constrained to ensure that observable features were ap-
proximately unperturbed on a jet-by-jet basis. However,
it is worth considering adversarial examples which have
limited resemblance to any particular jet in the origi-
nal dataset, while preserving properties of ensembles of
events (such as the jet mass distribution). One may be
able to generalize the procedures described here using
constraints on sufficiently large mini-batches or even on
entire datasets.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The interest in deep learning methods for HEP has
grown significantly since the first studies were published
five years ago [4]. While these methods hold great
promise to enhance experimental sensitivity to discover
new fundamental properties of nature, conventional anal-
ysis techniques must be updated. We have shown that
neural networks using high-dimensional low-level features
(and to a lesser extent, high-dimensional high-level fea-
tures) are highly sensitive to mismodeled inputs. Current
uncertainty estimates may not be sufficient to address
uncertainties involved when using high-dimensional fea-
tures, and traditional validation methods may be ineffec-
tive in detecting such problems. We have proposed adver-
sarial approaches to evaluate and compare the sensitivity
of deep learning-based analysis procedures. While this is
a crude bound, it may be used to demonstrate robustness
against specific classes of uncertainty, or to diagnose sit-
uations where further studies are needed. This work will
hopefully begin a dialogue within the community about
the robust application of deep learning to experimental
measurements and searches.
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